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The Arrest Prior to Extradition of
Fugitives from Justice of
Another State
By D. McKAY SNOW*
THE Constitution of the United States, article IV, section 2, provides
that a fugitive from Justice of a sister state, upon demand of its execu-
tive, shall be delivered to the authorities of that state to answer the
charges made against hnt.1 The purpose of this article is to investigate
the laws of the several states concerning the requirements for a valid
arrest within their borders of fugitives from justice, where the arrest
is made before demand for extradition.2
The Law Prior to the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act
Whereas modernly the concern of the law has been directed toward
the requirements for a valid arrest prior to demand for extradition, the
issue which claimed the attention of the first courts of our land to con-
sider the problem was whether such an arrest could be valid under any
circumstances. The earliest reported decision, People v. Wright,3 was
decided by New York's highest court in 1804. The prisoner was re-
leased on a writ of habeas corpus, the court holding that a New York
justice of the peace has no jurisdiction over crimes perpetrated in
another state and that the formal extradition procedure is 'exclusive,
even as to the arrest of the fugitive. In 1807 the same New York court
had before it a pair of cases m which the issue was whether a lower
New York court could proceed to the trial of defendants for crimes
committed in other states.4 In one of the cases, People v. Schenck,5
Member, Washington State Bar Association.
1 This section of the Constitution is implemented by 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1964).
2The issue is whether there is authority to make such arrests. Probable cause is
immaterial since even if it is present, the officer may be acting ultra vires. That arrest
prior to extradition is exclusively a matter of state and not federal law was determined
by Burton v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 245 U.S. 315 (1917).
3 2 Cai. Cas. 212 (N.Y. 1804).
4People v. Schenck, 2 Johns. R. 479 (N.Y. 1807); People v. Gardner, 2 Johns. R.
477 (N.Y. 1807). In the Gardner case it was held that New York had no jurisdiction
to try the defendant for stealing a horse in Vermont.
5 2 Johns. R. 479 (N.Y. 1807).
[7671
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the trial jury had returned a special verdict that the defendant was
guilty of stealing a gun in New Jersey The court on appeal held that
New York had no jurisdiction to try the defendant for a crime against
the laws of another state, but the court ordered that the New Jersey
authorities be notified and that the prisoner be held three weeks to
allow them time to take him into custody Tins appears to be the ear-
liest example of arrest prior to interstate extradition, and there is no
discussion in the case of the authority for the procedure followed.
An 1821 Georgia decision6 appears to be the next case to allow
arrest pending demand for extradition. The decision is based on "prin-
ciples of comity" and cases relied on by counsel, but not cited in the
opinion. Other courts soon handed down similar decisions.7
The courts also began to define the legal conditions upon winch
arrests pending extradition could be made. A three-way split of author-
ity soon developed: (1) that the arrest was invalid unless a warrant
of arrest was first secured from a local magistrate, (2) that an arrest,
with or without a local warrant, was invalid unless a "charge '8 had
been made against the suspect in the state where the crime was com-
mitted, and (3) that such an arrest could be made without a warrant
and if no charge had been filed merely on the same requirements of
probable cause as governed arrests for crimes against the laws of the
asylum state.9
Although the third rule has been denominated the "common law"
rule,10 its primary development in tins country" was in the twentieth
6 State v. Howell, R.M. Ch. 120 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1821).
7 E.g., Morrell v. Quarles, 35 Ala. 544 (1860); Ex parte Watson, 2 Cal. 59 (1852);
State ex rel. Adams v. Buzne, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) (1846); State v. Loper, 2 Ga. Dec. 33
(Super. Ct. 1842); Botts v. Williams, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 687 (1856); Common-
wealth v. Tracey, 46 Mass. (5 Met.) 536 (1843); In re Fetter, 23 N.J.L. 311 (1852);
In the Matter of Heyward, 1 Sandf. 701 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1848) (dictum); Common-
wealth ex rel. Short v. Deacon, 10 S.&R. 125 (Pa. 1823) (dictum); Ex parte Donaghey,
2 Pittsb. B. 166 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1860); Commonwealth v. Fassit, Vaux 30 (Pa., Philadel-
phia Recorders Ct. 1842); State v. Anderson, 1 Hill 327 (S.C. 1833); Ex parte Romanes,
1 Utah 23 (1876).
8 What constitutes a "charge" is discussed tnfra note 16.
9 This is the position taken in RFSTATEMENT (SEcoND), ToRTs § 119, comment e
(1965).
104 WHARToN, CRnMINAL LAW AND PRocEDuan § 1609 (Anderson ed. 1957);
Perkns, Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L. REv. 201, 243 (1940). See also note 11, infra. But
one court has called the "local warrant" rule the common law rule. Bank of Cotton-
wood v. Hood, 227 Ala. 237, 149 So. 676 (1933).
31 It appears to have been a well established common law rule in England that a
person suspected of a crime in one part of the Empire could be arrested and held
in another. Col. Lundy's Case, 2 Ventr. 314, 86 Eng. Rep. 460 (Ex. 1691), appears to
be the earliest. The Exchequer Chamber there held that the defendant could be sent
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century ' 2 The 'local warrant" and "charge" rules had their genesis fifty
years earlier in the judicial construction of state statutes establishing
the local procedures for formal extradition.13
The "Charge" Rule
The earliest American case to support any of the rules is State v.
Anderson,1 4 decided in South Carolina in 1833. In holding that a
private citazen could arrest a Georgia murder suspect without a South
Carolina warrant the court stated, "I hold, that to justify the arrest, it
is only necessary to shew that the prisoner is charged m another state
to Ireland to be tried for a "betrayal" committed as Governor of London-derry. He
had been arrested in Scotland and imprisoned in the Tower of London. Reliance was
placed on an earlier unnamed case before the King's Bench involving a crime com-
mitted in Barbadoes, West Indies, and an arrest and confinement in England. In Rex v.
Kimberly, 2 Strange 848, 93 Eng. Rep. 890 (K.B. 1730), the defendant was arrested and
confined in England for an illegal marriage in Ireland. The prisoner was refused ad-
mission to bail. In East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Vez. 246, 28 Eng. Rep. 478 (Ch. 1749)
it was held that the accused could be sent from England, where he had been arrested,
to India, where the crime bad been committed. Inasmuch as none of these cases dis-
cussed the legal requisites of the arrest it appears that the courts assumed that the
usual rules of arrest apply here also. However, the reliance of some American courts
on these decisions is of doubtful validity because the sovereignty of the King over the
scattered parts of the Empire was almost unrestricted, whereas in this country the
states themselves possess many of the attributes and powers of sovereignty.
12 See In the Matter of Henry, 29 How. Pr. 185 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865), and State
v. Taylor, 70 Vt. 1, 39 Ad. 447 (1898), discussed in the text accompanying notes 30
through 36 mifra. SPEAn, ExTnAmrriON, INTmA-nONAL AND INTERsTATE 307-345 (3d
ed. 1885), thoroughly discusses all statutory and judicial authority existing at his time
and nowhere is there any implication that an arrest pending extradition can be made
except upon the warrant of a local magistrate.
Some of the earlier cases cited as a basis for the rule do not directly support it.
E.g., State v. Anderson, 1 Hill 327 (S.C. 1833), discussed in the text accompanying
note 14, tnfra, which is cited in State v. Taylor, supra, and by Professor Perkins in Law
of Arrest, 25 IowA L. REV. 201, 243 (1940); State v. Howell, R.M. Ch. 120 (Ga.
Super. Ct. 1821), cited in REsTATEumNT, TORTS, Commentary § 146(a, b) at 38 (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1927). The latter case holds only that detention pending demand for
extradition is lawful; the legal requisites of the arrest were not considered. Other cases
sometimes cited in support of the rule are inconclusive on the point. Holdings that an
arrest is valid where no local warrant had issued and where a charge had been filed
in the state of the crime are consistent with both the "charge" rule and the "common
law" rule. E.g., State v. Loper, 2 Ga. Dec. 33 (Super. Ct. 1842); Ex parte Romanes,
1 Utah 23 (1876). In a similar category are cases wherein it does not appear whether
the arrest was with or without a local warrant. State v. Howell, supra; People v.
Schenck, 2 Johns. R. 479 (N.Y. 1807) (see text accompanying note 5 supra); In re
Fetter, 23 N.J.L. 311 (1852). State v. Swope, 72 Mo. 399 (1880) is cited occasionally
in favor of the "charge" rule, but it merely held that an affidavit to secure a local
warrant must allege that the suspect had committed a crime in another state.
23 See cases cited notes 14, 17, 23, infra.
1-11 Hill 327 (S.C. 1833).
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with treason, felony or other crime." 5 The court did not define a
"charge," 16 but held that a copy of a Georgia murder indictment was
sufficient evidence that a charge had been made.
An 1856 Kentucky court17 came independently to a similar con-
clusion based on its construction of a Kentucky statute permitting
justices of the peace to issue warrants for the arrest of fugitives. Two
more recent courts have also followed the "charge" rule in cases where.
the arrest was made without a local warrant,' but one of these erro-
neously ignored contrary superior authority in its own state.'9
A number of courts have held ,that a charge in the state of the
crime is prerequisite even to the issuance of a valid local warrant of
arrest.2 0 The strongest statement of the rule and the reasoning behind
it is found in an interesting suit in federal court for false imprisonment
and personal in]uries.21 Tennessee sheriff's officers had a Tennessee
15 Id. at 356. The court reasoned that a person was subject to arrest prior to ex-
tradition if he was subject to formal extradition. Since one of the constitutional require-
ments for extradition is that a person be charged in the state of the crime the court
concluded that a charge in the state of the crime is therefore mandatory for an arrest
prior to extradition.
1i Generally, an "indictment or affidavit before a magistrate or by some other
equivalent accusation sanctioned by the laws of that state" is said to be sufficient
Reichman v. Hams, 252 Fed. 371, 379 (6th Cir. 1918); State v. Hufford, 28 Iowa
391 (1870); Wilkins v. Bax, 262 S.W.2d 663 (Ky. 1953); Smith v. State, 21 Neb. 552,
32 N.W 594 (1887). But some courts have required more. Ex parte White, 49 Cal.
433 (1875) (requiring that prosecution be pending); State ex rel. Grass v. White, 40
Wash. 560, 82 Pac. 907 (1905) (an uncertified, unauthenticated Kansas arrest warrant
held insufficient). However, in Haggard v. First National Bank of Mandan, 72 N.D.
434, 8 N.W.2d 5 (1942), an oral accusation made to a deputy sheriff was held to be
sufficient.
17Botts v. Williams, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 687 (1856). "[11n no case can a fugitive
from justice from another state be arrested in this, except upon the production of the
indictment found against hun in the state from which he may have fled, or upon affi-
davit made by the prosecutor that he has thus been guilty " Id. at 696. A 1953
case reaffirmed the rule, Wilkins v. Bax, 262 S.W.2d 663 (Ky. 1953) (dictum).
iS Smith v. State, 21 Neb. 552, 32 N.W 594 (1887); People ex rel. Sidran v.
Warden of City Prison, 129 Misc. 327, 220 N.Y. Supp. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
19The Sidran case, supra note 18, ignored an earlier case establishing the "common
law" rule. Burton v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 147 App. Div. 557, 132 N.Y. Supp.
628 (1912), aff'd mem., 210 N.Y. 567, 104 N.E. 1127 (1914).
2 0 Reichnan v. Hams, 252 Fed. 371 (6th Cir. 1918); Ex parte White, 49 Cal.
433 (1875); State v. Hufford, 28 Iowa 391 (1870); Forbes v. Hicks, 27 Neb. 111,
42 N.W 898 (1889) (see also Smith v. State, supra note 18); Ex parte Lorraine, 16
Nev. 63 (1881); State ex rel. Grass v. White, 40 Wash. 560, 82 Pac. 907 (1905). Note
that these cases do not preclude the "local warrant" rule applying in the respective
states since in each a local warrant had been obtained, but held void because no
charge had been filed in the state of the crime.
2 1 Rechman v. Hams, supra note 20. The case was decided before Ene R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), but the court based its decision on a Tennessee
statute.
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warrant for the arrest of the plamtiff's nephew, a Negro, for a crime
committed in Mississippi. They believed hum to be Inding in plaintiff's
house, which they surrounded and dynamited when the occupants,
apparently because of fear, refused to come out as ordered. The
nephew was not in the house. The court rejected the defense that the
warrant justified the actions of the officers:
And we understand the rule to be that in a proceeding before a
magistrate for the arrest of a person so charged, it must appear by
admissible proof that in the state where the crime was committed he
stands charged through indictment or affidavit before a magistrate or
by some other equivalent accusation sanctioned by the laws of that
state. Nor can such a showing be excused upon counsel's theory
that the time required to serve a proper warrant would enable the
fugitive to escape arrest by passing "from state to state in immunity,
while those who pursued him sought to get warrants." This is to ig-
nore the declared legislative policy of Tennessee; it is to assert a
degree of license in the matter of arrests which would open the law
to serious abuse and render it an instrument of oppression; these
statutory provisions were framed with reference, not alone to actual
fugitives, but also to the rights, the individual liberty and security, of
innocent persons as well.22
The eeLocal Warrant" Rule
A surprising number of courts have arrived at this rule without
citation of any prior case authority.23 With one exception24 all of the
courts holding to this rule have based their decision primarily on state
statutes authorizing magistrates to issue arrest warrants prior to the
institution of formal extradition proceedings.25 The holding in each of
22 Reichman v. Hams, supra note 20, at 379-80.
23 Morrell ,v. Quarles, 35 Ala. 544 (1860) (dictum); Glazar v. Hubbard, 102 Ky.
68, 42 S.W 1114 (1897); Wells v. Johnston, 52 La. Ann. 713, 27 So. 185 (1898);
Malcolmson v. Scott, 56 Mich. 459, 23 N.W 166 (1885); In the Matter of Heyward,
1 Sandf. 701 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1848) (dictum); State v. Shelton, 79 N.C. 605 (1878);
Tarvers v. State, 90 Tenn. 485, 16 S.W 1041 (1891); George v. Railway Co., 78 W Va.
345, 88 S.E. 1036 (1916) (dictum).
24 Ex parte Donaghey, 2 Pittsb, R. 166 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1860), relying on the dictum
in In the Matter of Heyward, supra note 23. There appears to have been no statute
in Pennsylvania at the time.
25 Bank of Cottonwood v. Hood, 227 Ala. 237, 149 So. 676 (1933); State v. Engle,
115 Conn. 638, 162 Ad. 922 (1932); Glazar v. Hubbard, 102 Ky. 68, 42 S.W 1114
(1897); Wells v. Johnston, 59 La. Ann. 713, 27 So. 185 (1898); Malcolnson v. Scott,
56 Mich. 459, 23 N.W 166 (1885); In the Matter of Heyward, supra note 23; State
v. Shelton, 79 N.C. 605 (1878); Tarvers v. State, 90 Tenn. 485, 16 S.W 1041 (1891);
George v. Railway Co., 78 W Va. 345, 88 S.E. 1036 (1916) (dictum). The Engle and
Bank of Cottonwood cases relied on cases from other jurisdictions to reinforce their
own interpretations of the pertinent statutes. There are in addition cases which follow
prior authority in their own jurisdiction: In re Leland, 7 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 64 (N.Y.
Super. Ct. 1899), following In the Matter of Heyward, supra note 23; Wall v. State,
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these cases is that the statute provides an exclusive mandatory proce-
dure and is not merely permissive in its effect. As the Michigan court
stated, "Michigan cannot treat foreign offenses as domestic, and there
is nothing in our statutes which contemplates an arrest without a
warrant, for purposes of extradition."26 The Connecticut court has
more recently stated the rule:
It has been held that the statutory conditions governing the arrest
of fugitives from ]ustice must be strictly complied with. Where
such statutory provisions do not authorize it an officer has no author-
ity to arrest without a warrant a fugitive from ]ustice from another
State, even upon telegraphic or personal request of the officers of the
demanding State.27
It should be noted that Kentucky is apparently the only jurisdiction
which expressly applied both the 'local warrant" and "charge" rules,28
although the application of both is implied in the decisions of other
courts. 29
The "Common Law" Rule
With one exception, all court decisions applying this rule have been
handed down since 1898. Thus, in spite of its name, it is of more
recent origin in this country than the other two rules.80 The exception
is the case of In The Matter of Henry,3i handed down by a lower
court in a habeas corpus proceeding in New York in 1865. The arrest
was without a warrant and was based on a telegram from Chicago
police requesting the arrest of the petitioner. The court did not discuss
the interstate aspects of the arrest, nor did it refer to the applicable
New York statute. 2 The only authority relied upon was a New York
25 Ala. App. 584, 151 So. 611 (1933) and Tennessee v. Hamilton, 28 la. App. 587,
190 So. 306 (1939), following Bank of Cottonwood v. Hood, supra; Bircham v. Com-
monwealth, 238 S.W.2d 1008 (Ky. 1951), aff'd, 245 S.W.2d 932 (Ky. 1952), citing
as the rule in Kentucky, Glazar v. Hubbard, supra, and Botts v. Williams, 56 Ky. (17
B. Mon.) 687 (1856).
26 Malcolmson v. Scott, 56 Mich. 459, 466, 23 N.W 166, 169 (1885).
2
7 State v. Engle, 115 Conn. 638, 645, 162 Atl. 922, 925 (1932).
2 8 Botts v. Williams, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 687 (1856); see note 17 supra and
accompanying text; Glazar v. Hubbard, 102 Ky. 68, 42 S.W 1114 (1897). Both are
cited as the rule in Kentucky in Bircham v. Commonwealth, 238 S.W.2d 1008 (Ky.
1951), aff'd, 245 S.W.2d 932 (Ky. 1952).29 In the Matter of Heyward, 1 Sandf. 701 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1848) (by implica-
tion); Ex parte Donaghey, 2 Pittsb. B. 166 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1860) (semble).
80 See note 11 supra, discussing the English cases and their applicability to the
sovereign states of our Union.
3i 29 How. Pr. 185 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865).
82 N.Y. Laws 1839, ch. 350, at 23. The statute is quoted in part and construed
to require a "charge" in the Matter of Heyward, 1 Sandf. 701 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1848).
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case33 upholding an arrest without a warrant where both the crime
and the arrest occurred in the state of New York. The judge obviously
proceeded on the assumption, probably erroneous in light of the New
York statute, that for purposes of determining the validity of an arrest
without a warrant, it made no difference m which state the crime was
committed. However, the court ordered the prisoner released because
of undue delay in taking him before a magistrate after his arrest.
The leading case in support of the "common law" rule is State v.
Taylor,3 4 an 1898 Vermont decision. A Vermont constable had received
a telephone call informing him that the post office in a nearby New
York town had been robbed and that the suspects were headed in his
direction. The court held the ensuing arrest valid, relying on Henry
and State v. Anderson.3 5 If Henry is doubtful authority for the propo-
sition, Anderson is even worse. The Anderson decision is the initial
authority for the "charge" rulel3
6
The policy behind the rule was well stated by the judge in Union
Pacific R.R. v. Belek. 7
The power of the proper peace officer to make arrest, without a
warrant, of a fugitive from justice, provided he has reasonable cause
to believe he has committed a felony has also been declared
If this power does not exist, then one who has committed a felony
may make his escape across the narrow boundary that may exist be-
tween two states, and be free from arrest by officers who may know
of his guilt and may even have seen his offense committed, because
no complaint in writing has been filed in the state where the crime
occurred, nor has another complaint been filed in the state to which
the crimial has fled, nor has a warrant been issued there. Such pre-
posterous delay would often result in successful escape.38
33 Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend. 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829).
3470 Vt. 1, 39 AUt. 447 (1898).
351 Hill 327 (S.C. 1833).
36 See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra. It is somewhat iroical that in 1901,
Anderson was overlooked in its own state. There is dictum contrary to Anderson in
State v. Whittle, 59 S.C. 297, 37 S.E. 923 (1901). The case was a homicide prosecu-
tion against persons who killed an escapee from a Georgia chain gang while attempting
to arrest him. The defendants requested an instruction on their right to arrest without
a warrant for a crime committed in another state and the trial court gave one, but
the defendants, on appeal, objected to the wording. No one apparently objected to the
law embodied in the instruction. The trial court was affrmed. The instruction was
based on statutory language.
s7211 Fed. 699 (D. Neb. 1913).
38 Id. at 707. This was before Ene R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), but the
court was determining the validity of an Idaho arrest. Although the policy argument of
the court is sound, the reliance on certain decided cases is not. Anderson is discussed
in the text accompanying notes 14-16 supra. In Cochran v. Toher, 14 Minn. 385 (1869),
the court expressly declined to pass on the issue, but released the prisoner because
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Tins same pragmatic approach is no doubt the underlying basis of all
the decisions winch have held to tins rule.3 9
Federal Crimes
An interesting question is what law applies when the arrest is
made by state officers for a federal crime committed in another state.
No decided case has been found winch squarely presented the issue.
One coming close to the situation was United States v. Iuvelis.40 There
Delaware officers were waiting at the Delaware end of a bridge leading
into that state from New Jersey as the defendants committed the fed-
eral crime of crossing the state line with illicit lottery paraphernalia.
The interjurisdictional issue was not raised and the court applied
federal law without discussion. A Kentucky case, Bircham v. Com-
monwealth,41 presents a similar fact situation. Kentucky at the tiiae
of the case followed the "local warrant" rule, but the court held that
the Kentucky officers were authorized to arrest without a warrant
because the federal crime of crossing state lines to avoid confinement
after conviction of a felony was being committed in their presence.
These two cases appear to constitute the only authority on the issue.
Where the federal crime is committed within the boundaries of
the state where the arrest is made by state officers it is well established
that state law controls the legality of the arrest.42 State law also con-
of undue delay in presenting hun before a magistrate after his arrest. In Simmons v.
Vandyke, 138 Ind. 380, 37 N.E. 973 (1894), a charge had been made in the state of
the crime.
39 Ralph v. Pepersack, 218 F Supp. 932 (D. Md. 1963) (applying Distnct of
Columbia law ); Union Pacific R.R. v. Belek, supra note 37; Edwards v. State, 196 Md.
233, 76 A.2d 132 (1950); Kratzer v. Matthews, 233 Mich. 452, 206 N.W 982 (1926),
which erroneously "distinguished" Malcolmson v. Scott, 56 Mich. 459, 23 N.W 166
(1885), ignoring the language quoted in the text accompanying note 26, supra; Loper
v. Dees, 210 Miss. 402, 49 So. 2d 718 (1951) (semble); State v. Fleming, 240 Mo. App.
1208, 227 S.W.2d 106 (1950); In re Sifola, 101 N.J. Eq. 540, 138 At]. 369 (Ch. 1927);
Burton v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 147 App. Div. '557, 132 N.Y. Supp. 628 (1912),
aff'd mem., 210 N.Y. 567, 104 N.E. 1127 (1914); Haggard v. First Natl Bank, 72 N.D.
434, 8 N.W.2d 5 (1942) (court required a "charge" but held an oral accusation by a
citizen to a deputy sheriff sufficient); Silver v. State, 8 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Crim. 1928)
(without discussion of the interstate aspects of the case); Williams v. Commonwealth,
142 Va. 667, 128 S.E. 572 (1925); State ex rel. Brown v. Spangler, 120 W Va. 72,
197 S.E. 360 (1938), overruling George v. Railway Co., 78 W Va. 345, 88 S.E. 1036
(1916) (dictum); State v. Taylor, 70 Vt. 1, 39 Atl. 447 (1898). See also State v.
Whittle, 59 S.C. 297, 37 S.E. 923 (1901) (dictuni), discussed supra note 36.
40 194 F Supp. 745 (D.N.J. 1961).
41238 S.W.2d 1008 (Ky. 1951), aff'd, 245 S.W.2d 932 (Ky. 1952).
42 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S.
581 (1948).
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trols if the arrest is made by federal officers,4s except where a special
federal statute controls." But even though state law controls, it can
be argued that the state extradition laws were intended to apply
only to extradition to co-equal sovereign states of the Umon and not
to the question of rendition to superior sovereignty of the federal
government. State police appear to have a "common law" authority to
arrest for federal crnes45 and since a crime against the superior sover-
eign is involved it should make no difference that the crime was com-
mitted in a sister state which is also subject to the superior sover-
eign.46 The situation is analogous to county officers arresting for a
state crime committed in another county Such procedure appears to
be universally permitted.47
The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act48
The objective here is to attempt an answer to the question of to
what extent the Uniform Act has altered the prior law on arrest pend-
ing extradition.
The effect on the "local warrant" rule should be clear. Section 14
of the Uniform Act49 authorizes arrests without a warrant "upon rea-
sonable information that the accussed stands charged m the courts of
43 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
44 E.g., Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960) (arrest and search
at a border of the United States).
45 United States v. Story, 294 Fed. 517 (5th Cir. 1923); United States v. Bumbola,
23 F.2d 696 (N.D.N.Y. 1928). Compare the English cases discussed in note 11 supra.
46 Marsh v. United States, 29 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1928).
47 E.g., Manning v. Atchison, T. & S.F By., 42 N.M. 381, 79 P.2d 922 (1938);
Davis v. Carroll, 172 App. Div. 729, 159 N.Y. Supp. 568 (1916); Ware v. State, 207
S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Crnm. App. 1947); Eberhart v. Murphy, 113 Wash. 449, 194 Pac. 415
(1920).
48 The Uniform Act has been passed into law by the legislatures of all states except
Louisiana, Nevada, North Dakota, Mississippi, South Carolina and Washington. 9
UxNonm LAws ANN., 1965 Supp. at 137.
49 "Arrest Without a Warrant.-The arrest of a person may be lawfully made also
by any peace officer or a private person, without a warrant upon reasonable informa-
tion that the accused stands charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable
by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, but when so arrested the
accused must be taken before a judge or magistrate with all practicable speed and
complaint must be made against hun under oath setting forth the ground for the
arrest as in the preceding section; and thereafter his answer shall be heard as if he
had been arrested on a warrant." Maryland enacted the Uniform Act in 1937 but
omitted § 14, the authorization to arrest without a warrant. This would appear to
indicate a legislative intention that such authority be withheld. But see Edwards v.
State, 196 Md. 233, 76 A.2d 132 (1950), where an arrest for a Virginia bank robbery
made without a Maryland warrant was held valid. The legislative omission of § 14
was not discussed.
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a state with a crime "50 The obvious interpretation is that a charge
must be filed in the courts of the state where the crime was committed
before an arrest without a warrant can be made.51
Thus the Uniform Act, in refuting the 'local warrant" rule, appears
to affirm the "charge" rule, not only in the case of arrests without a
warrant, but also, according to section 13, in certain cases of arrest
with a local warrant. Section 1352 requires different standards for the
50 (Emphasis added.) The language is taken from ScoTT, INTERSTATE RErrION
§ 107 (1917): "IT~he arrest may be made by an officer or a private citizen, without a
warrant, upon probable or reasonable information that the accused stands charged
with a felony in the courts of the State from which he is alleged to have fled." See
HANDBOOK OF =Hn NATiONAL CoNimN cE oF Com.issIoNERs ON Uriironm STATE
LAws, 1926, at 588 (1926). Scott elsewhere states, "But the well-settled and recognized
rule is that, a person charged with the commission of a felony or other crime m a
certain State, fleeing to another, may, before executive demand for his arrest and return
is made on the governor of that state, from [sic] [to?] which he has fled, be arrested in
the state in which he is found." ScoTT, supra § 102.
51 One case reaching a contrary result has been found. Commonwealth v. Negri,
414 Pa. 21, 198 A.2d 595 (1964). Philadelplua police were investigating a gangland
slaying and several officers went to New Jersey to interrogate a suspect who informed
the officers that the killing had been done by the defendant, now hiding out in New
York City. Although it was 9:30 p.m., some of the officers went to New York while
others went back to Philadelphia to get a warrant. The arrest was made jointly by
New York and Philadelphia officers without a New York warrant. It does not appear
whether the other Philadelphia officers had succeeded in obtaining a Pennsylvania war-
rant before the arrest or whether this information was communicated to New York
before the arrest was made. In any event, the Pennsylvania court, although it stated
that New York law controlled, did not discuss the Uniform Act or the interstate nature
of the crime and arrest. The arrest would have been valid under New York law prior
to the Uniform Act, Burton v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 147 App. Div. 557, 132
N.Y. Supp. 628 (1911), aff'd mem., 210 N.Y. 567, 104 N.E. 1125 (1914).
In the other cases upholding arrest without a local warrant the accused had been
charged in the courts of the state where the crime was committed. Powell v. Turner,
167 Kan. 524, 207 P.2d 492, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 835 (1949); Johnson v. Reddy, 163
Ohio St. 347, 126 N.E.2d 911 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Huey v. Dye, 373 Pa.
508, 96 A.2d 129 (1953); Commonwealth ex rel. Cohick v. Keeper of County Prison,
85 Pa. D. & C. 394 (Dist. Ct. 1952); Mullins v. Sanders, 189 Va. 624, 54 S.E.2d 116
(1949). In In re Caudill, 352 P.2d 926 (Okla. Cnm. 1960), it does not appear whether
a charge had been filed. Only in the Mullins case did a court place particular weight
on the fact that a charge had been made. The court there held that a Kentucky warrant
"constituted 'reasonable information' to the deputy sheriff that Mullins stood
charged in the courts of another State. " Mullins v. Sanders, supra at 119. For
further discussion of the case see note 61, infra.
52 "Arrest Prior to Requisition.-Whenever any person within this state shall be
charged on the oath of any credible person before any judge or magistrate of this state
with the commission of any crime in any other state and with having fled from justice,
or with having been convicted of a crime in that state and having escaped from con-
finement, or ,having broken the terms of hIs bail, probation or parole, or whenever
complaint shall have been made before any judge or magistrate in this state setting
forth on the affidavit of any credible person in another state that a crime has been
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issuance of a warrant m two distinguishable situations. First, where a
"credible person" personally appears before the magistrate, that person
must charge under oath only that (1) the accused committed a crime
in another state and (2) fled from justice. Second, where a complaint
is made before the magistrate setting forth the affidavit of any credible
person in another state a higher standard is required. The affidavit
must allege, (1) that a crime has been committed in that state, (2)
that the accused has been charged in that state with the commission of
the crime and (3) has fled from justice. 3
In view of the dearth of authority5 4 under the Uniform Act the
question of the extent to which it changes the prior law in each state
is difficult to resolve. In the only reported case factually presenting
the issue it was not raised.55
The 'local warrant" rule appears to have been abandoned 5 in
committed in such other state and that the accused has been charged in such state with
the commission of the crime, and has fled from justice, or with having been con-
victed of a crime in that state and having escaped from confinement, or having broken
the terms of is bail, probation or parole and is believed to be in this state, the judge
or magistrate shall issue a warrant directed to any peace officer commanding him to
apprehend the person named therein, wherever he may be found in this state, and to
bring hun before the same or any other judge, magistrate or court who or which may
be available in or convement of access to the place where the arrest may be made, to
answer the charge or complaint and affidavit, and a certified copy of the sworn charge
or complaint and affidavit upon which the warrant is issued shall be attached to the
warrant."
Query- Does the omission from § 14 of escapees, bail jumpers, and probation and
parole violators mean that they cannot be arrested without a warrant? Powell v.
Turner, 167 Kan. 524, 207 P.2d 492, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 835 (1949) reaches a
negative result in the case of an Illinois parole violator arrested by a Kansas sheriff as
he was released from a federal penitentiary; however, the issue was not raised.
53 No case under the Uniform Act has been found which is mcoasistent with § 13.
Two cases have been found which are consistent with § 13 but they did not raise the
issue directly since in both a charge had been made in the state of the crime. Simpers
v. Wilson, 75 A.2d 254 (Del. Super. Ct. 1950); People v. Lawson ex rel. Jenkins, 285
App. Div. 1207, 140 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1955).
54 This dearth of authority indicates one of two things: (1) that very few cases
arse in which issues can be raised under §§ 13 and 14, or more probably, (2) that
counsel and the courts are over looking a ground on which a habeas corpus petition
can be based. E.g., State of Tennessee v. Hamilton, 28 Ala. App. 587, 190 So. 306
(1939); Simpers v. Wilson, supra note 53; Wilkins v. Bax, 262 S.W.2d 663 (Ky.
1953); People ex rel. Sidran v. Warden of City Prison, 129 Misc. 327, 220 N.Y. Supp.
529 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
55Commonwealth v. Negri, 414 Pa. 21, 198 A.2d 595 (1964), discussed supra
note 51.
56 The jursdictions in which courts had formerly adhered to the 'local warrant"
rule and which would now seem to have abandoned it through the Uniform Act are:
Connecticut. State v. Engle, 115 Conn. 638, 162 At. 922 (1932) (Uniform Act
enacted in 1957).
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all but two jurisdictions, Louisiana57 and Alabama, surviving m the
latter apparently m spite of the Uniform Act.58
The jurisdictions which adhered to the "charge" rule before their
adoption of the Uniform Act would seem to be unaffected by it, 59
Kentucky. Botts v. Williams, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 687 (1856). See note 28 supra
and accompanying text. (Uniform Act enacted in 1960).
North Carolina. State v. Shelton, 79 N.C. 605 (1878) (Uniform Act enacted in
1937).
Pennsylvania. Ex parte Donaghey, 2 Pittsb. R. 166 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1860) (Uniform
Act enacted in 1941). But see Commonwealth v. Negri, discussed note 51 supra.
Tennessee. Tarvers v. State, 90 Tenn. 485, 16 S.W 1041 (1891) (Uniform Act
enacted in 1951).
See 9 UNIFOPt LAWS ANN., 1965 Supp. at 137 for citations to statutes.
Three other jurisdictions whose courts had formerly advocated that rule judicially
abrogated it prior to the Uniform Act. They are Michigan, New York and West Virginia.
See cases cited note 39 supra.
57 Wells v. Johnston, 52 La. Ann. 713, 27 So. 185 (1898). No subsequent cases
have been found but the statute is substantially the same today as it was then. Com-
pare LA. CODE Canm. L. & Poc. ANN. art. 168 (Dart 1943), with the language of the
statute quoted in Wells. Louisiana has not adopted the Uniform Act. The court in the
Wells opinion did, however, make the following reservation: "We do not mean to say
that exceptional cases might not occur, which, from their special features, would
justify a sheriff in departing from this course but the present is not one of those cases."
Wells v. Johnston, supra at 717, 27 So. at 189. Cf. Abraham v. Boat Center, Inc., 146
So. 2d 23 (La. App. 1962).5 8Alabama enacted the Uniform Act in 1931. 9 Uont LAws ANx., 1965
Supp. at 129. In a 1933 false imprisonment case, deciding the validity of a 1929 arrest,
the court applied the local warrant rule. Bank of Cottonwood v. Hood, 227 Ala. 237,
149 So. 676 (1933). This decision was followed later the same year by a lower court
of appeals in a criminal prosecution. Wall v. State, 25 Ala. App. 587, 151 So. 611
(1933). The date of the arrest does not appear. In a 1939 habeas corpus proceeding,
the appeals court held that a Tennessee arrest warrant "has no extra-territorial power,
and gives no authority to any person, to arrest and hold the petitioner outside the state
of Tennessee." State of Tennessee v. Hamilton, 28 Ala. App. 587, 190 So. 308 (1939).
This statement is in apparent conflict with the language of § 14 of the Uniform Act:
"upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged in the courts of a
state " In none of these Alabama cases was the Uniform Act mentioned.
59 These jurisdictions are:
Califorma. Ex parte White, 49 Cal. 433 (1875) (Uniform Act enacted in 1937).
Iowa. State v. Hufford, 28 Iowa 391 (1869) (Uniform Act enacted in 1949).
Kentucky. Botts v. Williams, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 687 (1856); see note 28 supra
and accompanying text. (Uniform Act enacted in 1960).
Nebraska. Smith v. State, 21 Neb. 552, 32 N.W 594 (1887); Forbes v. Hicks, 27
Neb. 111, 42 N.W 898 (1889) (Uniform Act enacted in 1935).
See 9 UNiFoiu LAws ANN., 1965 Supp. at 129 for citations to statutes.
The courts of two states which have not enacted the Uniform Act have also an-
nounced the "charge" rule:
Nevada. Ex parte Lorraine, 16 Nev. 63 (1881).
Washington. State ex rel. Grass v. White, 40 Wash. 560, 82 Pac. 907 (1905).
South Carolina's position is somewhat in doubt. See note 36 supra. The Uniform
Act has not been legislated in South Carolina.
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and although it could well be argued that the statute dictates the
"charge" rule in those jurisdictions which prior to the act adhered to
the "common law" rule, 0 this issue is almost totally unresolved.61
Professor Perkins summed up the state of the law and the conse-
quent law enforcement problems in the following terms:
60 The jurisdictions which prior to the Uniform Act adhered to the "common law"
rule are:
Michigan. Kratzer v. Matthews, 233 Mich. 452, 206 N.W 982 (1926) (Uniform
Act enacted in 1937).
Missouri. State v. Fleming, 240 Mo. App. 1208, 227 S.W.2d 106 (1950) (Uniform
Act enacted in 1953).
New Jersey. In re Sifola, 101 N.J. Eq. 540, 138 Ati. 369 (Ch. 1927) (Uniform
Act enacted in 1936).
New York. Burton v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 147 App. Div. 557, 132 N.Y. Supp.
628 (1911), aff'd mem., 210 N.Y. 567, 104 N.E. 1127 (1911) (Uniform Act enacted
in 1936).
Texas. Silver v. State, 8 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Cnm. 1928) (Uniform Act enacted in
1951).
Virginia. Williams v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 667, 128 S.E. 572 (1925) (Uniform
Act enacted in 1940).
West Virginia. State ex rel. Brown v. Spangler, 120 W Va. 72, 197 S.E. 360 (1938)
(Uniform Act enacted in 1937. The arrest was in 1936 and the case was decided with-
out reference to the Uniform Act.)
Maryland established the "common law" rule after the enactment of the Uniform
Act, but the Maryland legislature omitted § 14, so the decision is not in conflict with
the express language of the Maryland statute, although it may be in conflict with the
legislative intention. See note 49 supra.
Mississippi, North Dakota and possibly South Carolina are adherents of the
"common law" rule which have not yet enacted the Uniform Act. See cases cited
note 39 supra.
A count of the courts following each rule shows that prior to the respective enact-
ments of the uniform law, eleven (including Maryland) followed the "common law"
rule, eight followed the "local warrant" rule and six followed the "charge" rule.
(Kentucky is counted for both of the last two rules and South Carolina is not counted
for any.)
G1Perhaps some indication is given by comparing Williams v. Commonwealth,
142 Va. 667, 128 S.E. 572 (1925), following the "common law" rule, with Mullins v.
Sanders, 189 Va. 624, 54 S.E.2d 116 (1949), where the court, in a case arising under
§ 14 of the Uniform Act, stressed that a Kentucky warrant of arrest "constituted 'rea-
sonable information' to the deputy sheriff that Mullins stood charged in the courts
of another state. " Id. at 627, 54 S.E. 2d at 119. This emphasis (phrased in the
language of the statute) would have been unnecessary under the "common law" rule.
In fact, under that rule the West Virginia deputy may have made a wrongful arrest.
The arrest was made at the insistence of Sanders (who had procured the Kentucky
warrant and was therefore held liable for abuse of process) on a bad check which had
"bounced" on a partnership signature technicality. Mullins was willing to make the
check good, but couldn't get any money from the bank because it was Sunday. The
deputy was therefore very reluctant to make the arrest and did so only because of
the Kentucky warrant. Whether in absence of the statute the Kentucky warrant gave the
West Virginia deputy probable cause is quite debatable. State of Tennessee v. Hamilton,
supra note 58.
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It has been said that the common-law authority of an officer or a
private person to arrest without a warrant on reasonable suspicion of
felony applies whether the felony has been committed locally or with-
in some other state of the Uion, but the possibility of change by stat-
ute must be considered . A number of states. . have interpreted
existing statutes to authorize arrest for offenses not committed within
the jurisdiction only in cases in which the person to be arrested has
been formally charged with cme in some other state. [W]hat is
needed is authority to arrest a felon fleeing into the state before there
has been time for any formal charge against him, and the information
is received by telephone, telegraph, or radio. It is important to bear
in mind that in many jurisdictions. . no such authority exists at the
present time.
62
Professor Perkins adds, "Even the UNwFoiu ExTAD rr N Acr seems
not to grant such authority ,63
It seems highly undesirable that police officers should be left with-
out legal authority to arrest one entering their state who is known
to have committed a crime in the neighboring state. However, in
whatever form the solution develops, extreme care must be taken
adequately to protect the rights of innocent citizens.
A Proposal for Legislative Solution64
Arrest Without a Warrant
A reading of the cases on arrest pending extradition discloses that
a significant number of such cases involve arrests by, or at the insti-
tution of, private persons seeking either to vindicate a supposed per-
sonal grievance or collect a reward, or acting out of an exaggerated
sense of public duty.6" Anglo-American law of arrest has traditionally,
and with good reason, withheld from private citizens all the powers
and immunities which it grants to duly appointed law enforcement
officers.66 In similar manner, limitations should be imposed in the
62 Perkins, Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L. BEv. 201, 243-44 (1940).
63 Id. at 244 n.285.
64 Not all cases cited hereafter involve arrest pending extradition. Intrastate cases
have been used as authority where applicable.
6 5 Reicnan v. Hams, 252 Fed. 371 (6th Cir. 1918); Umon Pacific R. v. Belek, 211
Fed. 699 (D. Neb. 1913); Bank of Cottonwood v. Hood, 227 Ala. 237, 149 So. 676
(1933); Cunnigham v. Baker, 104 Ala. 160, 16 So. 68 (1894); Whiftlock v. Boyer,
77 Ariz. 334, 271 P.2d 484 (1954); Botts v. Williams, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 687 (1856);
Malcolnson v. Scott, 56 Mich. 459, 23 N.W 166 (1885); Forbes v. Hicks, 27 Neb. 111,
42 N.W 898 (1889); Ex parte Lorraine, 16 Nev. 63 (1881); State v. Shelton, 79 N.C.
605 (1878); Haggard v. First Natl Bank, 72 N.D. 434, 8 N.W.2d 5 (1942); State
v. Whittle, 59 S.C. 297, 37 S.E. 923 (1901); State v. Anderson, 1 Hill 327 (S.C.
1833); Tarvers v. State, 90 Tenn. 485, 16 S.W 1041 (1891).
66 Perkins, supra note 62, at 233-38.
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area of arrest pending extradition to minimize the opportunities for
abuse of individual rights. In the frontier era of our country's history
a 'local warrant" rule would seem justified insofar as arrests by private
persons were concerned, since it required them to show probable
cause before a magistrate of the state where the suspect was found.
However, today it would appear sufficient for the protection of mdi-
vidual rights if private persons were merely required to be able to
show that the suspect had been formally charged in the state where
the crime was committed, or that the the crime was committed m the
presence of such private person and that he followed the fugitive into
the asylum state in fresh pursuit.
Consistency would dictate that where a police officer makes an
arrest based solely on information from a private person that he also
be required to show that the accused stands charged in the state where
the crime was committed. However, in cases where the arrest is based
on a communication17 from another police officer it should be presumed
that a reliable investigation has been made6 8 and the officer receiving
the information should have authority to arrest without a warrant,
whether or not the accused has been formally charged in the state
of the crime.
Arrest With a Warrant
The same reasons persuasive of the "charge" rule in the case of
private persons arresting without a warrant require that the distinction
of section 13 of the Uniform Act 9 be retained where the warrant is
67 See discussion in text infra.
6s United States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1951); People v. Shellin, 227
Cal. App. 2d 245, 38 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1964); State v. Pokin, 45 Hawaii 295, 367 P.2d
499 (1961); Farrow v. State, 233 Md. 526, 197 A.2d 434 (1964); State v. Britton, 137
Wash. 360, 242 Pac. 377 (1926); Eberhart v. Murphy, 113 Wash. 449, 194 Pac. 415
(1920).
"What information was in possession of the officers of Lincoln County, although
not commumeated to the officers in Spokane, was not necessary to be disclosed to
them." State v. Britton, supra at 378.
"[Blut they had received a 'look out' for the defendant from a responsible source
and we think that is sufficient." Farrow v. State, supra at 437.
Of course the arrest should be held invalid if in fact the investigating officer had
no probable cause. United States v. Bianco, supra (dictum); Whitlock v. Boyer, 77
Ariz. 334, 271 P.2d 484 (1954); People v. Harvey, 156 Cal. App. 2d 516, 319 P.2d
689 (1958); Gill v. State, 134 Tex. Cnm. 363, 115 S.W.2d 923 (1938). But see Parks
v. State, 180 Miss. 763, 178 So. 473 (1938), where the arrest was said to be justified
even if the investigating officer did not have information of a credible nature. This
is in essence a "bootstrap" operation with the communication serving as the strap.
69 Note 52 supra and accompanying text.
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to issue on the application of private persons. 0 Where such person is
personally before the magistrate of the asylum state it is not necessary
that the suspect be formally charged m the state of the crime. Where,
however, the warrant is to be based on the affidavit of a private person
not before the court, the local magistrate should require a showing
that the suspect has been formally charged m the state of the crime.
In the case of official police communications, however, for the rea-
sons discussed in respect to arrests without a warrant, a magistrate
should be empowered to issue a warrant of arrest regardless of any
accusation, or absence of it, before a ]udicial officer m the state of
the crime.
The Police Communication
An official police communication should not m every case operate
to give the officer receiving it carte blanche authority to arrest and full
immunity from the consequences. It would seem that as mmnmum
requisites for the validity of the consequent arrest, the commumcation
should (1) positively and affirmatively request that an arrest be made7'
and (2) contain sufficiently complete and detailed information to
enable the receiving officer properly to identify the person to be
arrested.72 In furtherance of the fundamental policy of protecting the
freedom of movement and freedom from harrassment of innocent
70 See cases cited note 65 supra and accompanying text.
71 United States v. Juvelis, 194 F Supp. 745 (D.N.J. 1961) (dictum); Cunningham
v. Baker, 104 Ala. 160, 16 So. 68 (1894); Whitlock v. Boyer, 77 Ariz. 334, 271 P.2d
484 (1954) (semble); State ex rel. Brown v. Spangler, 120 W Va. 72, 197 S.E. 360
(1938).
72 That the information must be complete and detailed enough to permit accurate
identification: United States v. Juvelis, supra note 71, Davis v. Carroll, 172 App. Div.
729, 159 N.Y. Supp. 568 (1916) (dictum).
The information communicated was held insufficient to justify the arrest of the
defendant in: State v. Miles, 29 Wash. 2d 921, 190 P.2d 740 (1948) ("two young
men" held insufficient for arrest of two men in their forties); Gatlin v. United States,
326 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Negro male, wearing light trench coat, about 6 ft.
tall, 150 to 170 lbs., held insufficient to arrest one who fit the description); People v.
Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658 (1963) (white male, fairly tall, large build,
dark hair, wearing a red sweater, held insufficient to arrest one who fit the description);
People v. Gibson, 220 Cal. App. 2d 15, 33 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1963) (white male, wearing
dark glasses, dark felt hat, leather jacket, held insufficient to arrest one who fit the
description). As was stated in the Mickelson case, supra, at 450, 380 P.2d at 660, "There
could have been more than one tall white man with dark hair wearing a red sweater
abroad at night in such a metropolitan area. The officer had no information that
the robber had an automobile or a confederate."
In no case was the information held insufficient where the automobile occupied by
the suspect was described with reasonable accuracy. See, e.g., Ralph v. Pepersack, 218
F Supp. 932 (D. Md. 1963) (applying District of Columbia law).
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persons, any interstate commuication which does not satisfy these
two requirements should not be permitted to constitute the legal
justification for the arrest of a fugitive from justice of another state.73
The police departments of our nation should be efficient enough to
meet these nummum requirements in the vast majority of cases without
significantly hampering the effectiveness of their law enforcement
operations.
7 Even if the two suggested requisites of a communication are met the arrest may
still be invalid. See Manning v. Atchison, T. & S.F Ry., 42 N.M. 381, 79 P.2d 922
(1938), where the arrest was unlawful because the person arrested did not reasonably
fit the description communicated. See also Wallner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Mary-
land, 253 Wis. 66, 33 N.W.2d 215 (1948), where even though the arrest of the wrong
person was valid because the person strongly resembled the description given, the
officer was nevertheless civilly liable for refusing proffered evidence of the arrested
person's identity and for detaining him without attempting to determine whether in
fact the right person had been arrested.
And even if the two suggested requisites are not met, an arrest may nevertheless be
valid if that information which is communicated is corroborated or supplemented by
independent investigation. See Jackson v. United States, 319 F.2d 782 (5th Cir. 1963);
People v. Shellin, 227 Cal. App. 2d 245, 38 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1964); Jones v. State, 195
Tenn. 390, 259 S.W.2d 864 (1953).
Tort liability for false arrest should lie against the officer receiving the commumca-
tion and making the arrest only if (1) he acts unreasonably in light of the otherwise
sufficient information communicated (see the Manning and Wallner cases, supra) and
(2) if he acts unreasonably in light of inadequate information received (see cases
note 72 supra). In all other cases liability should rest solely with the investigating or
communicating officers. "A telephone message cannot immunize irresponsible investiga-
tion." United States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716, 719 (3d Cir. 1951).
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